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focus on the role of idiosyncratic participants with heterogeneous information. We look at 
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limits and the impact of the recent financial crisis. We also improve upon existing tests for 
fundamental and non-fundamental herding, as well as proposing a method for investigating herd 
behaviour of different groups of investors. Empirical evidence based on the Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange in Vietnam reveals a greater level of herding on up compared to down market days, 
and a significant reduction in the magnitude of herding following the crisis. We document robust 
intentional herding even when unintentional (fundamental) herding is factored out. Our empirical 
results also uncover potential within-group herding and between-group interactions among 
arbitrageurs and noise traders in the market. 
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1. Introduction 
Herding towards the stock market consensus has been receiving great attention from both 
academics and policy makers. In the existence of herding, a group of investors tend to trade in 
the same direction over a period of time, leading to observed behaviour patterns that are 
correlated across individuals (Bikhchandani et al., 1992), which is an undesirable consequence 
for risk diversification. As another major consequence of herding, if market participants tend to 
herd around the market consensus, investors’ trading behaviour can cause asset prices to deviate 
from their fundamentals, resulting in assets being inappropriately priced. Herding thus is of 
considerable concern to market participants, as it could cause investors to transact at inefficient 
prices (Fama, 1970; Christie & Huang, 1995), increase difficulty for investors in performing 
diversification (Chang et al., 2000; Venezia et al., 2011), and accelerate financial market 
volatility and instability (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2001). 
 
Empirical literature on herd behaviour is generally categorised into two main strands. The first 
strand relies on detailed investor-specific data to detect herding by institutional investors in the 
form of correlation in trading patterns among a particular group of investors, usually fund 
managers (see, among others, Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999; 
and Frey et al., 2014). The second strand makes use of aggregate market data and aims at 
uncovering co-movements towards the market consensus due to individual investors’ behaviour 
(see, among others, Christie & Huang, 1995; Chang et al., 2000; Galariotis et al., 2015). This 
paper falls within the second strand, testing for herding towards the market consensus with a 
focus of further exploring the role of idiosyncratic investors with heterogeneous information. 
 
Evidence documented in the literature indicates that herd behaviour is more likely to occur in 
emerging markets, where there might not be many experienced market participants and the 
governing rules regarding the release and the flow of information are limited, leading to diverse 
responses and interactions among idiosyncratic investors when they are exposed to 
heterogeneous information. For instance, investors might act differently in the process of 
collecting and analysing information. Less sophisticated investors may find it costly to collect 
and analyse information on their own, and therefore tend to mimic what more successful 
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investors do (Villatoro, 2009; Chiang & Zheng, 2010). Trading with heterogeneous information 
due to information asymmetry also plays a major role in creating herds. Bikhchandani and 
Sharma (2001) argue that, under the situation of information asymmetry, some investors might 
supress their own sets of private information and turn to follow others’ behaviour due to intrinsic 
preference for conformity. When investors do not make their investment decisions 
simultaneously, such information cascades could easily turn into so-called intentional herding. 
Moreover, when investors are faced with inadequate supply of firm-specific information, which 
is likely to happen in emerging markets, they might resort to using solely macroeconomic 
information, resulting in similar investment decisions when facing similar decision problems 
with similar information sets (such as fundamental information regarding the macro economy 
and aggregate financial market). Such phenomenon, discussed in Bikhchandani & Sharma 
(2001), is referred to as spurious herding and has subsequently been investigated in Klein (2013), 
Bohl et al. (2014), and Galariotis et al. (2015). Consequently, heterogeneity among market 
participants and information could be a key factor in determining and hence to understand herd 
behaviour in emerging markets. Empirical research on herding behaviour in emerging markets 
with a focus on the role of idiosyncratic participants with heterogeneous information, however, is 
still scarce.  
 
Though the literature on herd mentality in the stock market is vast, challenges remain when it 
comes to revealing the existence and the causing mechanism of herding empirically. One of the 
challenges is to purge out the impact of spurious herding so as to isolate and identify true 
(intentional) herding. Since information on the macro economy and the aggregate market is 
commonly known to the public, convergence in investors’ behaviour based on such information 
most likely does not necessarily involve investors reversing their decisions, and thus strictly 
speaking, is not herding (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2001). It is therefore important to factor out 
such fundamental-driven (spurious) herding before further exploring the possibility of intentional 
herding. Studies that do not make such a distinction might overestimate the existence and the 
intensity of herding. To address this issue, we follow the approach adopted in Galariotis et al. 
(2015) to separate and quantify spurious and intentional herding. More specifically, we 
decompose return dispersion (Cross Sectional Absolute Deviation, CSAD) into two parts by 
regressing it on conventional return factors (i.e., size, book-to-market, and momentum) proposed 
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in Fama & French (1995, 1996) and Carhart (1997).1 Given that these return factors capture 
significant information on the dynamics of macro economy and aggregate financial market, the 
fitted value of this regression captures dispersions due to investors’ reaction to changes in 
fundamental information which can be used to investigate fundamental-driven herding, while the 
residuals from this regression captures dispersions due to investors responding to non-
fundamental information. 2  Using this approach, Galariotis et al. (2015) document non-
fundamental herding in UK and US and intentional herding in US. In this paper, we explore the 
possibility of implementing this method using data from an emerging country. Further 
discussions on this approach are presented in Section 2. 
 
Another challenge is to build a closer link between theoretical arguments and empirical studies in 
order to identify the cause of herd mentality. Theoretical wisdom regarding causes of herding in 
the literature includes herding due to informational externalities and cascades (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992; and Bikhchandani et al., 1998), reputation-based 
herding (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990; Zwiebel, 1995; Prendergast & Stole, 1996; and Graham, 
1999; Rajan, 2006), and herding due to compensation structures (Trueman, 1994; Maug & Naik, 
1996; and Admati & Pfleiderer, 1997). 3  Whilst theoretical models on this topic are well 
developed, most empirical studies in the current literature nevertheless are based on purely 
statistical approaches usually not derived from theoretical models. This is due to the fact that 
detailed and reliable data that could be used to directly test these theories are scarce. Though we 
too do not have such rich information to isolate and test the existence of various theories directly 
in this paper, we make an effort to search for potential dominant causes of herding by 
incorporating idiosyncrasy among stock market participants in the analysis to further explore 
herds due to responses and interactions among idiosyncratic investors when they are exposed to 
																																								 																				
1 This is in line with approaches proposed by Klein (2013) and Bohl et al. (2014), who also utilised Fama-French 
and macroeconomics factors in their regressions to control for fundamental (spurious) herding. In our paper, we 
attempt to separate and quantify these two types of herding. 
2 Liew & Vassalou (2000) find that the two factors HML and SMB embody significant information regarding the 
growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in ten international markets, and that they can be used to predict future 
economic growth in some countries. 
3 See Devenow & Welch (1995) and more recently Bikhchandani & Sharma (2001) and Spyrou (2013) for literature 
review of theoretical models.	
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informational externalities and cascades (De Long et al., 1990a; Shleifer & Summers, 1990; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; and Bikhchandani et al., 1998). 
 
More specifically, instead of assuming investors are homogeneous like most of the studies in the 
herds towards market consensus literature, following Shleifer & Summers (1990), we assume 
that both arbitrageurs and noise traders exist in the stock market. Arbitrageurs are sophisticated 
and fully rational investors, who are more capable of identifying stocks that on average 
outperform the market (positive alpha) and constructing trading strategies centring on these 
stocks.4 They attempt to conduct arbitrage, but such action is limited as it could be risky.5 With a 
finite number of arbitrageurs in the market, under these assumptions, arbitrage alone is not 
powerful enough to direct stock prices towards their equilibrium levels. Noise traders, on the 
other hand, are less sophisticated investors who are not fully rational and tend to pick and trade 
stocks based on sentiments, and thus their trading patterns could be subject to systematic biases.6 
Many trading strategies conducted by noise traders are based on pseudo-signals and are 
correlated to each other, leading to the same judgement biases and persistent mistakes (Shleifer 
& Summers, 1990). Consequently, they are more likely to hold and trade stocks that on average 
underperform the market (negative alpha).  
 
Under these assumptions, in the presence of informational externalities and cascades, herds not 
only could happen among investors within each of these two groups (within-group herding) but 
																																								 																				
4 In this paper, for each stock, we assume that the estimated Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1968), i.e., the estimated 
constant obtained from an equilibrium four-factor asset pricing model based on Carhart (1997), is a sufficient 
indicator of expected average return over the one predicted for the underlying stock. Note that we do not assume 
that arbitrageurs only trade stocks with positive alphas or noise traders only trade negative alpha stocks (which is 
unlikely the situate in the practice), only that they are more likely to trade corresponding positive / negative alpha 
stocks. Due to data constraints, we are unable to further identify whether a stock is held by arbitrageurs or noise 
trader. However, we believe this is not an unreasonable assumption to make, and can help shed lights on the 
behaviour of different groups of investors in the markets. 
5 Shleifer & Summers (1990) identify two sources of risks that limit arbitrage, namely fundamental risk and risk due 
to unpredictability of the future resale price as suggested in (De Long et al., 1990a). 
6 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that some noise traders could also be ‘liquidity traders’ as claimed 
in the literature. In this paper, we follow the definition of noise traders in Black (1986), seeing them as those 
“trading on noise as if it were information”. This view is also adopted by De Long et al. (1990b), who note that 
noise traders “may get their pseudo-signals from technical analysts, stockbrokers, or economic consultants and 
irrationally believe that these signals carry information”.  
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also could happen due to interactions of investors between two groups (between-group herding). 
Within-group herding for arbitrageurs, captured by decreases in the dispersion of returns among 
stocks that on average outperform the market, is likely due to fund managers trading portfolios 
centring positive alpha stocks so as to herd to preserve reputation and/or compensation 
(Scharfstein & Stein, 1990; Admati & Pfleiderer, 1997) or due to arbitrageurs herd when they are 
exposed to information-based cascades.7 Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. 
(1998) show that, when the accuracy of the information with market participants is not a 
common knowledge, investors in the stock market, even when they are rational, may mimic the 
behaviour of an initial group of investors in the erroneous belief that this group knows something, 
leading to information cascades and herd mentality. Within-group herding for noise trader, 
captured by decreases in the dispersion of returns among stocks that on average underperform 
the market, however, is more likely due to irrational noise traders follow their intrinsic 
preference for conformity (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2001) and mimic each other’s action based 
on sentiments or beliefs that could not be fully justified (Shleifer & Summers, 1990). Between-
group herding or interaction could arise when arbitrageurs make active attempts to take 
advantage of noise traders’ moves. Given that arbitrage is risky and thus limited, arbitrageurs 
may as well create more positive signals if noise traders are already optimistic about particular 
securities so as to benefit from such herds (Shleifer & Summers, 1990). This would trigger 
further market jitters and herd mentality if irrational noise traders follow positive-feedback 
strategies, i.e., buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall (De Long et al., 1990a). In such a 
situation, between-group herding or interactions among investors from these two groups arise 
and the measure of return dispersion for each group could be potential explanatory variable to 
explain the dynamics of their counterpart.  
 
We test the above conjectures using data from Vietnam, where the stock market has been 
growing rapidly since 2000. We believe that Vietnam is suitable for our study for two reasons. 
Regarding legal regulations and market participants, as a young emerging market, Vietnam has 
																																								 																				
7 Scharfstein & Stein (1990) illustrate that, if the market does not have perfect information about fund managers’ 
ability and there is a need to share the blame when things go bad, reputation concerns could lead managers to 
follow each other’s actions. Maug & Naik (1996) and Admati & Pfleiderer (1997) both show that, in a principle-
agent setup and when managers’ compensation depends on how their performance compares with a benchmark in 
the market, managers’ action could be distorted and they turn to mimic each other. This usually ends up with an 
inefficient portfolio. 
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relatively few rules concerning information disclosures imposed on listed firms, while at the 
same time noise traders are likely to exist. Truong et al. (2007) document a limited supply of 
reliable information on firms and trading activities in Vietnam stock market where many traders 
usually trade on rumours and chase trends. These features make Vietnam a suitable example for 
studying herds due to diverse responses and interactions among idiosyncratic investors when 
they are exposed to heterogeneous information. There is evidence in the literature showing that 
foreign investors and institutional investors are more likely to be agents of bubbles instead of 
domestic individual investors (Choi et al., 2015). This is less likely to be the case in Vietnam 
given the limited participation of foreign and institutional investors in the stock market.8 The 
empirical results from aggregate Vietnam market data hence can be deemed as highly 
representative of individual investors, which could help overcome potential bias in our study as 
our data is not detailed enough to identify foreign and institutional investors. The empirical 
results documented in this paper thus not only unveil insights into the market in Vietnam, but 
also contribute to our understanding of herd behaviour in general and especially for young 
emerging markets. 
 
Our empirical results reveal overwhelming evidence of herd behaviour in Vietnam. Herding 
appears stronger on up vis-à-vis down market days, and is robust to daily price limit tests. We 
are also able to document evidence of a major reduction in the magnitude of herding following 
the recent global financial crisis. We further contribute to existing literature by modifying tests 
for fundamental and non-fundamental herding suggested in Galariotis et al. (2015). We note that 
the dispersion measure of returns among stocks, by mathematical construction, is more 
																																								 																				
8 Truong et al. (2007) report that “almost 90% of trading” in the Vietnam market is done by individuals. 
Additionally, in a World Federation of Exchange (WFE) interview, Tran Dac Sinh, CEO of the HOSE, reveals that 
of more than 1.3 million trading accounts on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE), more than 98% (1.28 
million) belong to domestic individual investors. In fact, participation by foreign and institutional investors is 
limited in Vietnam. The exchanges in Vietnam are dominated by local individual investors. Jalil Rasheed, the 
investment director for Southeast Asia at Invesco, commented in Shaffer (2014) that “Vietnam at this point in time 
is still very much a private equity market. It’s still not ready for institutional investors”. Furthermore, there was a 
disincentive for foreign (and potentially more sophisticated) investors to participate in the Vietnam market. This 
discouragement stems from a cap on public joint stock company ownership by foreigners, which at first was set at 
20%. The limit subsequently was raised to 30% in July 2003, and 49% in June 2009. Decision 55/2009/QD-TTg 
issued by the Prime Minister of Vietnam, which comes into effect on June 1, 2009, imposed a cap of 49% on the 
total number of stocks of a public joint-stock company that foreign investors, as a whole, are allowed to hold. This 
was not relaxed until 2015, when the Prime Minister approved of Decree 60/2015/ND-CP, which essentially 
permits unlimited foreign ownership of public companies in Vietnam under certain circumstances. The decision 
does not come into effect until September 1, 2015. 
	7 
	
responsive to changes in the magnitude of fundamental factors rather than their values, and 
therefore replace such factors with their absolute values in the equation used for decomposing 
total CSAD for subsequent testing. This improves the model performance and accuracy during 
the process of isolating the fundamentals-driven (or “spurious”) herding and non-fundamental 
driven (intentional) herding in the market. Another contribution is our identification strategy of 
potential systematic differences in the trading pattern of arbitrageurs and noise traders, assuming 
that a stock’s abnormal return (alpha) serves as a good proxy for classifying stocks into the 
typical portfolios that are more likely traded by each group of investors. We document potential 
evidence that, aside from within-group interactions, there exist interactions between arbitrageurs 
and noise traders, possibly stemming from the former taking advantage of the latter’s irrational 
trading mentality. 
 
The remaining of this paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and data 
used for testing of herd behaviour in the Vietnam stock market. Section 3 presents the empirical 
results and finally section 4 summarises the findings and discusses their implications.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
Vietnam currently has two stock exchange centres, both of which are less than two decades of 
age. The Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) went into operation on July 20th 2000 and 
commenced trading on July 28th 2000. The Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), on the other hand, 
was launched in March 2005, but did not commence trading until July 2005. In this paper, 
following previous literature on Vietnam stock market, we focus on the HOSE only. Although 
both of the two exchanges have considerable numbers of listed companies (as shown in Figure 
1), the HOSE is the main exchange in Vietnam. Not only does it have a longer history, its market 
capitalisation has consistently been higher than the HNX, which is clearly illustrated in Figure 2. 
As of 19 May 2015, the total market value of all shares listed on the HOSE was over 992 trillion 
Vietnam Dong (45 billion US Dollars). This was more than 7 times the figure for the HNX, 
which stood at only 141 trillion Vietnam Dong (6.5 billion US Dollars) at the end of the same 
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day. The stock market index for the HOSE is also commonly referred to as the Vietnam (VN) 
Index. The data employed in this paper are daily stock prices of all companies listed on the 
HOSE and the stock market index (VN Index) from January 2007 to May 2015, which are 
provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream. All prices and indices employed are adjusted closing 
prices and indices. 
 
Figure 1. Number of Listed Stocks on the Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchanges 2000-2015. 
 
Figure 2. Market Capitalisation – Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchanges 2011-2015. 
 
Figure 3 shows the movements of the HOSE index (VN Index) from its commencement in July 
2000 to May 2015. The index began at 100 on 28 July 2000 and within one year grew by an 
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impressive 470% to 571.04 on June 2001. However, as this is largely attributable to a temporary 
surge in demand for stocks by new investors, the index dropped to around 180 by mid-2002. The 
market did not really begin to rally until the middle of 2005, when the government relaxed the 
limit on ownership of listed companies by foreign investors from 30% to 49%. A period of 
considerable growth lasted from then until early 2007, around the time the Law on Securities 
came into effect (1 January) and Vietnam officially became a member of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (11 January). This culminated in an all-time high of the index of 1,170.67 
on 12 March 2007. The market did not stay at that level for long. After peaking, fuelled by the 
global financial crisis, the index began a downward trend, which did not end until 24 February 
2009, when it hit a 4-year low of 235.50. Since then, the market has been gradually recovering 
and the index stood at 536.82 at the last day of observation (19 May 2015) in our dataset. 
 
Figure 3. Vietnam Stock Market Index – July 2000 to May 2015. 
Data source: Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
 
2.2 Measures of Dispersion and Benchmark Specifications 
This section reviews measures of dispersion and model specifications commonly adopted in the 
literature, which forms the starting point of our empirical investigation. The literature on testing 
for herding towards market consensus largely follows Christie & Huang (1995), Chang et al. 
(2000), and Chiang & Zheng (2010). The two measures of dispersion commonly used are cross-
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sectional standard deviation (CSSD) and cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD) of returns, 
which are defined as follows: 
 !""#$ = &'(& (*+,$ − *.,$)0'+1&  (1) 
 !"2#$ = &' *+,$ − *.,$'+1&   (2) 
where *+,$  is the actual stock return of firm i at time t, and *.,$  is the actual cross-sectional 
average of all the N stock returns in the market portfolio at time t. Both measures quantify the 
average deviation of individual stock returns from the market return (*+,$ − *.,$ ). To avoid 
positive and negative deviations cancelling out, CSSD takes the square root of the average 
squared deviations, while CSAD simply averages out the absolute values of the deviations. !""#$  and !"2#$  will both increase when individual stock returns deviate from the market 
return. Decreases in the value of either dispersion measure would suggest that return on the 
market and stock returns are close together and hence could be a signal of potential herds 
towards market consensus.  
 
Different stocks have different degrees of sensitivity to the market, which will cause the 
dispersion to increase as the market return increases in absolute term. The presence of herd 
mentality during the extreme market movements, however, will draw individual returns closer to 
the market return, thus reducing dispersion. Christie & Huang (1995) hence propose the 
following dummy variable regression to test for herd behaviour: 
 !""#$ = 3 + 56#$6 + 57#$7 + 8$ (3) 
where #$6 and #$7 are dummy variables which equal 1 when the market return on day t lies in the 
extreme lower and upper tail, respectively, of the distribution, and are equal to 0 otherwise; 8$ is 
a random error term. Two criteria, 1% and 5% of the lower and upper tails of the market return 
distribution, are commonly set for extreme market movements. Under this specification, negative 
and statistically significant estimates of 56 and 57  would indicate herd behaviour in the market. 
The same logic applies when dependent variable is replaced by !"2#$. 
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Chang et al. (2000) illustrate that herding, if it exists, would introduce a non-linear relationship 
between !"2#$  and *.,$ , leading to disproportional changes in the !"2#$  when investors 
follow aggregate market behaviour during periods of large average price movements. Chang et 
al. (2000) hence propose the following regression, which expresses !"2#$  as a quadratic 
function of *.,$: 
 !"2#$ = 9: + 9& *.,$ + 90*.,$0 + 8$ (4) 
The absolute term *.,$  is included to capture the predicted linear relationship between return 
dispersion and mean return, while the quadratic term *.,$0  serves to capture possible non-
linearity in the relationship. If the market exhibits herd behaviour, return dispersion will either 
increase at a less-than-proportional rate, or in extreme cases, decrease with the market return, 
resulting in a negative and significant estimate (90) for the quadratic term. Note that equation (4) 
does not require the market to be at the extreme to pick up signs of herd mentality. Chang et al. 
(2000) illustrate that in the case of herd behaviour in an up market, equation (4) becomes !"2#$ = 3 + 9&*.,$ + 90*.,$0 + 8$  with a negative 90 coefficient, suggesting that !"2#$  does 
not start trending down until *.,$ reaches the value of *.,$∗ = − <=0<>. Thus, the dummy variable 
regression proposed in Christie & Huang (1995) may fail to yield negative signs of 57 if the 95th 
or 99th percentile of *.,$ is below *.,$∗ . While it is still possible for this specification to detect 
herding, it nevertheless requires a far greater magnitude of non-linearity in the return dispersion 
and mean return relationship for evidence of herding to surface. 
 
Chiang & Zheng (2010) introduce additional regressors to increase the models’ explanatory 
power, as well as to incorporate the interactions between stock markets in different countries. 
Specifically, the first major modification is the inclusion of *.,$ as a regressor: 
 !"2#$ = 9: + 9&*.,$ + 90 *.,$ + 9?*.,$0 + 8$ (5) 
This modification has a benefit of capturing any potential asymmetry in the relationship between 
market return and dispersion under different market conditions (up and down). In particular, for 
every unit change in market return, !"2#$ changes by 90 + 9& for positive *.,$ and by 90 − 9& 
negative *.,$. Asymmetry between dispersion and market return would be quantified by the ratio 
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<>A<=<>(<=. As a second way to test for differences in investor reactions on days when the market is up 
as opposed to when the market is down, Chiang & Zheng (2010) further propose to segregate the 
data into two groups by replacing *.,$ with (1 − #)*.,$ and #*.,$, and *.,$0  with (1 − #)*.,$0  
and #*.,$0 , where #  is a dummy variable that equals 1 when *.,$ < 0  and 0 otherwise. 
Following this specification, Chiang & Zheng (2010) document that herding is more apparent in 
Asian markets during up periods, and asymmetry does not exist in the advanced markets.  
 
The increasing integration of financial markets around the world and the leading role of the US 
market in international financial transactions have motivated researchers to further modify the 
specification as: 
 !"2#$ = 9: + 9&*.,$ + 90 *.,$ + 9?*.,$0 + 9E!"2#7F,$ + 9G*7F,.,$0 + 8$ (6) 
where !"2#7F,$  and *7F,.,$0  respectively represent the cross-sectional standard deviation and 
aggregate return for the US market. There is evidence in the literature showing that the two 
additional regressors improve the models’ explanatory power, indicated by higher adjusted R-
squared values. The coefficients on !"2#7F,$	(9E)  are significantly positive in some studies 
(Chiang & Zheng, 2010; Hwang et al., 2013; Galariotis et al., 2015), suggesting a potential 
cross-country influence of the US return dispersions in international markets, which Chiang & 
Zheng (2010) interpret as a signal of shock transmissions between similar sectors across national 
borders. This reveals that while some markets might not herd among themselves, they herd with 
the US market.  
 
2.3 Separating Dispersion due to Fundamental and Non-fundamental Information 
Following Galariotis et al. (2015), we decompose the total !"2#$ into two components, one to 
capture reactions to fundamental factors, and the other to capture reactions to non-fundamental 
factors.9 This is achieved by estimating the following equation: 
 !"2#$ = 5: + 5& *.,$ − *I + 50"JK$ + 5?LJM$ + 5EJNJ$ + 8$ (7) 
																																								 																				
9 Given that !""#$ is sensitive to outliners as suggested in the literature, we focus on !"2#$ for this part of analysis. 
We however obtain similar results using !""#$ measure. These results are available upon request.   
	13 
	
The fitted values of !"2#$  from equation (7) are defined as deviations due to fundamentals !"2#O7'P,$ , while the residuals are defined as deviations due to non-fundamentals 
(!"2#'Q'O7'P,$). Following Chiang & Zheng (2010) these variables are then used as dependent 
variables for the following models: 
 !"2#O7'P,$ = 9: + 9&#*.,$ + 90 1 − # *.,$ + 9?#*.,$0 + 9E 1 − # *.,$0 + 8$ (8) 
 !"2#'Q'O7'P,$ = 9: + 9&#*.,$ + 90 1 − # *.,$ + 9?#*.,$0 + 9E 1 − # *.,$0 + 8$ (9) 
Equation (8) is used to test for and quantify spurious herding, whilst (9) is employed to detect  
and quantify intentional herding. The dummy variable #  (equals 1 when *.,$ > 0  and 0 
otherwise) is employed to identify potential difference in investors’ behaviour in the up (9?) 
market and down (9E) market.  
 
2.4 Measures for Within-group Herding and Between-group Herding 
To identify potential within- and between-group herding, following previous discussion, we 
segment stocks into two groups according to their alpha values and calculate !"2#$ for each of 
these two groups. More specifically, we obtained estimated alpha value for each stock by firstly 
regressing the returns of each stock against factors in a four-factor model as proposed by Carhart 
(1997). The alpha values are recalculated on a yearly basis. Two !"2#$  measures are then 
calculated: one based on stocks with positive alphas (!"2#A,$), and the other one based on 
stocks with negative alphas (!"2#(,$). These two dispersion measures are then entered into the 
following regressions: 
 !"2#A,$ = 9: + 9&*A.,$ + 90 *A.,$ + 9?*A.,$0 + 9E*(.,$0 + 9G!"2#(,$ + 8$ (10) 
 !"2#(,$ = 9S + 9T*(.,$ + 9U *(.,$ + 9V*(.,$0 + 9&:*A.,$0 + 9&&!"2#A,$ + 8$ (11) 
where *A.,$0  and *(.,$0  are equally weighted (sub)market returns using stocks falling into 
positive and negative alpha group, respectively. Negative and significant estimates for 9? and 9V 
would indicate within-group herding, while negative and significant estimates for 9E  and 9&: 
would signal between-group herding. Significant estimates for 9G  and 9&&  would indicate 
interactions among investors from these two groups.   
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Empirical results based on benchmark measures and specifications reviewed above are presented 
in the next section. To compare our results with those reported in the literature, we first present 
and discuss results that do not distinguish fundamental and non-fundamental herding. Results 
making such distinction, as well as evidence on within- and between-group herding, will be 
discussed subsequently.  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of *.,$, !""#$ and !"2#$ for the HOSE under two proxies 
for the market return (Panel A: returns on an equally weighted portfolio constructed from data 
and Panel B: returns on the VN Index, i.e., capitalization-weighted index reported by 
Datastream). After the data cleaning process, which is reported in Appendix A, 2051 
observations remained. Since the observations start when the index was near its peak in March 
2007 and end before the market had the chance to fully recover from the global financial crisis, 
the mean of *.,$ under both definitions are negative, and the lower mean for Panel A (–0.060%) 
compared to Panel B (–0.032%) suggests that small stocks yielded lower returns than large 
stocks during the sample period. In both panels, the mean, standard deviation and maximum of !""#$ are all higher than !"2#$. This is in line with the remark in Chiang & Zheng (2010) on 
the sensitivity of !""#$ to outliers. In addition, values in Panel A are lower than their Panel B 
counterpart, which follows the fact that the unweighted average (or equally weighted) minimizes 
the sum of squared deviations. 
 
The major time series variables appear to be stationary as suggested by augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test statistics (Dickey & Fuller, 1979), all of which are significant at the 1% level. However, they 
also appear to be serially correlated, having significant first-order lag coefficients ranging from 
0.253 to 0.335. Therefore, all subsequent testing is done using heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors developed by Newey & West (1987). The 
reported standard errors in this paper were estimated using a lag length of 6 for HAC standard 
errors, as !""#$ and !"2#$ do not exhibit statistically significant autocorrelation of order 7 or 
above. The significance of the coefficients and conclusions would remain unchanged if we 
increased the lag length to 10, following the conventional truncation parameter guideline 
suggested in Stock & Watson (2011).  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of !",$, %&&'$ and %&('$ for the HOSE. 
 
Mean 
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Minimum 
(%) 
Maximum 
(%) 
Serial Correlation at Lags 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
ADF 
Statistic 
Panel A: Measures computed using returns on an equally weighted portfolio !",$ –0.060 1.524 –4.839 4.770 0.315*** –0.058** 0.057** 0.082*** 0.029 –0.014 –14.569*** %&&'$ 2.423 0.523 0.000 4.585 0.335*** 0.099*** 0.131*** 0.045* 0.133*** 0.089*** –7.409*** %&('$ 1.839 0.482 0.129 3.979 0.315*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 0.056** 0.119*** 0.079*** –8.710*** 
Panel B: Measures computed using returns on the stock market index (VN Index) !",$ –0.032 1.579 –6.051 4.647 0.253*** –0.041* 0.023 0.071*** 0.013 –0.013 –15.417*** %&&'$ 2.509 0.569 0.000 5.663 0.318*** 0.099*** 0.131*** 0.055** 0.120*** 0.094*** –7.927*** %&('$ 1.912 0.515 0.130 4.899 0.303*** 0.097*** 0.108*** 0.046** 0.119*** 0.088*** –8.821*** 
Notes: 
a) This table presents the daily mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of returns (!",$), cross-sectional standard deviation (%&&'$) and cross-
sectional absolute deviation (%&('$) for the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) in Vietnam. 
b) The deviations series are computed using equations (1) and (2) 
c) The sample range is from 31 January 2007 to 19 May 2015. Serial correlation is reported for lags 1 to 6, along with test statistics of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test. 
d) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3. Empirical Results and Discussion 
3.1 Dummy Variable Regression 
Table 2 reports the estimation results based on equation (3) proposed by Christie & Huang 
(1995). We also present in Table 2 the threshold (!") which #",% has to fall below for to be 
considered to lie in the lower tail of the distribution, as well as the threshold (&") which #",% 
has to rise above to be considered to lie in the upper tail of the distribution. These thresholds are 
affected by the criteria of 1%, 2% and 5% shown in the first column. 
 
Since we do not distinguish fundamental herding and intentional herding at this stage, the results 
potentially capture the effect of both of these two. Firstly, the table provides clear and 
overwhelming evidence of herd behaviour, as all estimates of '(  and ')  are negative and 
statistically significant even at the 1% level. The results are robust to different definitions of #",% 
and different measures of return dispersion (*+,-% and *++-%). 
 
Secondly, the degree of herding appears to increase with the extremeness of the market. As the 
percentage of observations of market returns classified as extreme decreases (from 5% to 1% 
percentile), the estimated dummy variable coefficients become more negative. For instance, in 
Panel A1, the estimates for ') decrease from –0.584 to –0.987 and to –1.438 as the criterion 
changes from 5% to 2% and 1%, respectively. Likewise, in Panel B2, '( coefficient decreases 
from –0.356 (5% percentile) to –1.067 (1% percentile).10  
 
Thirdly, in terms for asymmetry in herd behaviour, in all models, the ') coefficients are all more 
negative than their '(  counterparts. However, the null hypothesis that ') = '(  is rejected in 
some cases. This provides partial evidence of asymmetry of herd behaviour between up and 
down markets. Nevertheless, these results only describe herding during market stress periods, 
and thus cannot be generalised to the normal day-to-day behaviour of participants. As such, we 
now turn to empirical tests that are less stringent and do not require defining extreme market 
movements. 
																																								 																				
10 Note that a similar pattern can be seen in Chang et al. (2000) for the stocks in Taiwan on up market days. 
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Table 2 
Dummy Variable Regression. 
Criteria Constant /0 /1 02 (%) 12 (%) 34 54 p-value 
Panel A1: CSSD regression results using return on an equally weighted portfolio 
1% 2.449*** –0.973*** –1.438*** –4.280 3.999 0.117 9.956*** 0.002 
 [0.024] [0.102] [0.107]      2% 2.459*** –0.735*** –0.987*** –3.889 3.404 0.111 3.073* 0.080 
 [0.024] [0.096] [0.108]      5% 2.472*** –0.387*** –0.584*** –2.810 2.497 0.081 5.556** 0.019 
 [0.025] [0.060] [0.072]      Panel A2: CSAD regression results using return on an equally weighted portfolio 
1% 1.863*** –1.067*** –1.292*** –4.280 3.999 0.121 3.423* 0.064 
 [0.020] [0.102] [0.066]      2% 1.874*** –0.825*** –0.906*** –3.889 3.404 0.126 0.473 0.492 
 [0.021] [0.093] [0.080]      5% 1.879*** –0.356*** –0.442*** –2.810 2.497 0.062 1.181 0.277 
 [0.022] [0.063] [0.066]      Panel B1: CSSD regression results using return on the market index (VN index) 
1% 2.531*** –0.680*** –1.299*** –4.337 3.957 0.071 5.538** 0.019 
 [0.025] [0.194] [0.197]      2% 2.538*** –0.534*** –0.858*** –3.923 3.522 0.063 2.774* 0.096 
 [0.025] [0.142] [0.141]      5% 2.538*** –0.221*** –0.358*** –2.874 2.572 0.024 1.491 0.222 
 [0.026] [0.085] [0.091]      Panel B2: CSAD regression results using return on the market index (VN index) 
1% 1.934*** –0.909*** –1.194*** –4.337 3.957 0.084 1.934 0.164 
 [0.022] [0.161] [0.142]      2% 1.943*** –0.703*** –0.819*** –3.923 3.522 0.085 0.604 0.437 
 [0.022] [0.118] [0.106]      5% 1.941*** –0.275*** –0.304*** –2.874 2.572 0.028 0.090 0.765 
 [0.023] [0.077] [0.078]      Notes: 
a) This table reports estimated coefficients of the following regression model: 6% = 7 + '(-%( + ')-%) + 9%, where 6% is *+,-%  or *++-% ; -%(  (-%) ) equals 1 if the market return on day t lies in the extreme lower (upper) tail of the 
distribution. The 1%, 2% and 5% criteria refer to the percentage of observations in the upper and lower tail of the 
market return distribution. :; and <-value are statistics for the Wald test with the null hypothesis =>: ') = '(. 
b) Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in square brackets.  
c) Column !" shows the 1st, 2nd and 5th percentiles of #". -%( is given the value of 1 for all observations with values #" 
lower than !" . Column &"  shows the 95th, 98th and 99th percentiles of #" . -%)  is given the value of 1 for all 
observations with values #" higher than !". 
d) Panels A1 and A2 report results using the return on an equally weighted portfolio as a proxy for the market return. 
Panel B1 and B2 report results using the return on the capitalization-weighted stock market index (VN index) as a 
proxy for the market return.  
e) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3.2 Tests for Herd Behaviour using Chang et al. (2000) Specification & Further Tests for 
Herding Asymmetry 
Table 3 presents the regression based on the specification proposed in Chang et al. (2000), which 
explores the non-linearity in the CSAD-market return relationship in the presence of herding. 
Again, the results are indicative of herd behaviour, with all estimated @;  coefficients being 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, ranging from –0.124 to –0.158. To illustrate 
the effect of herd formations in the market, consider the up market model in Panel A. The fitted 
values of the return dispersion follow the quadratic function: 
 *+,-% = 1.664 + 0.476× #",% − 0.158#",%; , ∀	#",% > 0 (12) 
As the (absolute) return on the market goes up, rational market forces act to drive individual 
stock returns away from each other, thus raising return dispersion by 0.476% on average (the 
coefficient on #",%) for each percentage increase in market return. At the same time, however, 
there are also irrational forces (herd behaviour) at work, which draw individual returns closer 
together, as evidenced by the negative coefficient –0.158 on the quadratic term #",%; . At lower 
levels of #",% , the combined effect of these forces results in *+,-%  rising at a less-than-
proportional rate with #",%. Once the market return reaches a certain level, in this case 1.503(%) = − >.NOP;× Q>.RST , *+,-% will even decrease with #",% (shown in Figure 4). It is also this level that 
the extreme observations of #",% need to exceed for the Christie & Huang (1995) test to start 
picking up evidence of herding (that is, to yield negative ') estimates). As shown in the last 
section, the Christie & Huang (1995) specification in this case did manage to pick this up, since 
even the broadest criterion (5%) for extreme movements requires #",% to be as high as 2.497% 
(see Table 2) in the sample. A similar analysis can be performed with the down market 
considered. As illustrated in Figure 5, in the case of a bear market, *+,-% starts narrowing once 
the market falls by at least 1.711(%). 
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Figure 4. CSAD and Return on Equally Weighted Portfolio on Up Market Days. 
 
Figure 5. CSAD and Return on Equally Weighted Portfolio on Down Market Days. 
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Table 3 
Results based on Chang et al. (2000) Specification. 
Up/Down 
Market 
Constant UV  32,W 	UX  32,W4 	(U4) 34 54 p-value 
Up 1.664*** 0.476*** –0.158*** 0.226 
  
 
[0.032] [0.050] [0.011] 
   
Down 1.659*** 0.425*** –0.124*** 0.139 7.183*** 0.007 
 
[0.032] [0.077] [0.019] 
   
Notes: 
a) This table reports estimated coefficients of the following regression model: *+,-% = @> + @R #",% + @;#",%; +9%, where #",%  denotes the absolute return on the market and #",%;  represents the squared market return. In the 
up/down model, all observations are restricted to those with positive/negative #",%. :; and <-value are statistics 
for the Wald test with the null hypothesis =>: @;)[ = @;\]^_. 
b) Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
c) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
To allow for asymmetry in investor behaviour during up market days and down market days, we 
adopt the following specifications proposed in Chiang & Zheng (2010): 
 *+,-% = @> + @R-#",% + @; 1 − - #",% + @`-#",%; + @N(1 − -)#",%; + 9% (13) 
where -  takes on the value of 1 for observations with #",% > 0 , and 0 otherwise. The 
coefficients on -#",%  and (1 − -)#",%  reflect the relationship between *+,-%  and #",%  when 
the market is up and down, respectively. The coefficients on -#",%;  and (1 − -)#",%; , on the 
other hand, respectively capture the levels of herding in the market during up and down 
movements. 
 
The results are reported in Table 4. The herding coefficients (@` and @N), are still negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, once again confirming the robustness of herd behaviour 
in the Vietnam market. The coefficients for -#",%;  (herding in the up market) are more negative 
than for (1 − -)#",%;  (herding in the down market). Two-sided Wald tests reject thenull 
hypothesis of herding symmetry (=>: @` = @N) in model (a) at the 5% level and in model (b) at 
the 10% level, while one-sided tests (=a: @` < @N) reject the null hypothesis in both cases at the 
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5% level. These results imply that herding is stronger in the up market vis-à-vis the down 
market. 
 
Note that the above findings of stronger herd forces during the up market are consistent with 
previous studies on herds in Asian financial markets. Chang et al. (2000) document that for 
Taiwan the null hypothesis of herding symmetry is rejected at the 1% level. Chiang & Zheng 
(2010) find the herding effect for a group of Asian countries to be stronger in up markets than in 
down markets, especially in China, Japan, and Hong Kong. It is also worth noting that all the 
strong evidence of herding asymmetry documented came from the models that use the returns on 
an equally weighted portfolio as the proxy for market returns #",%. Most of the Wald statistics 
from such models are significant at the 1% level or lower, while those from the models using the 
market index return (capitalisation-weighted index) as a proxy for #",% are either insignificant or 
significant at the 10% level only. Since the equally weighted portfolios give individual returns 
equal weights, and the market index approach gives more weights to larger capitalisation stocks, 
it can be inferred that the stronger herding force documented in the up market comes from small 
capitalisation stocks. 
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Table 4 
Further Tests for Asymmetry in Herd Behaviour. 
Model 
Constant UV  c32,W UX  X − c 32,W U4  c32,W4  Ud  X − c 32,W4  Ue  34 
Panel A: Regression Results 
(a) 1.662*** 0.480*** –0.422*** –0.159*** –0.124*** 0.179 
 [0.023] [0.043] [0.064] [0.010] [0.016]  
(b) 1.742*** 0.413*** –0.363*** –0.133*** –0.099*** 0.108 
 [0.030] [0.048] [0.072] [0.012] [0.020]  
Model 5X4 p-value1 544 p-value21 p-value22  
Panel B: Test Statistics for Asymmetry in Investor Behaviour  
(a) 0.989 0.320 5.216** 0.022 0.011  
(b) 0.692 0.406 3.496** 0.062 0.031  
Notes: 
a) This table reports estimated coefficients of the following regression model: *+,-% = @> + @R-#",% +@; 1 − - #",% + @`-#",%; + @N(1 − -)#",%; + 9% , where - = 1  for all observations with #",% > 0 , and 0 
otherwise. Model (a) uses the return on an equally weighted portfolio as proxy for the market return (#",%), 
while Model (b) uses the capitalization-weighted market index (VN index).  
b) :R; and <-value1 are statistics for the Wald test with the null hypothesis =>: @R = −@;. 
c) :;; is the Chi-squared statistic for the Wald test of the hypothesis =>: @` = @N; <-value21 is the p-value for the 
two-sided test (alternative hypothesis =a: @` ≠ @N ), while <-value22  is the p-value for the one-sided test 
(alternative hypothesis =a: @` < @N). 
d) Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
e) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3.3 Impact of the Daily Price Limit 
In Vietnam, there are limits on the ranges of prices at which stocks can be traded on each day, 
imposed by the State Securities Commission (SSC). In particular, stock price volatility could not 
exceed a specified percentage compared to the closing values on the previous trading day. Once 
the trading price hits the limit, it will be bound at either the ceiling or floor price allowed. As 
reported by Chang et al. (2000), similar rules also exist in stock exchanges in Taiwan and South 
Korea, where the limits are set at 7% and 6% per day, respectively. The current daily price limit 
for the HOSE is 7%; nevertheless, this has been adjusted quite regularly over the years by the 
SSC. Table 5 summarises how the limit has fluctuated since the exchange went into operation in 
2000: 
 
Table 5 
Daily Price Limits for the HOSE from 2000. 
Date Daily Price Limit Date Daily Price Limit 
28/07/2000 ± 2% 27/03/2008 ± 1% 
13/06/2001 ± 7% 07/04/2008 ± 2% 
15/10/2001 ± 2% 16/06/2008 ± 3% 
01/08/2002 ± 3% 18/08/2008 ± 5% 
23/12/2002 ± 5% 15/01/2013 ± 7% 
Data source: Hoang Vu (2013) 
 
It is possible for the daily price limits to affect the overall evidence in favour of herding. By 
limiting the daily price movements of stocks, the restrictions could have prevented individual 
stock prices from moving further away from each other, thereby lowering cross-section 
dispersion (*+,-%) and causing @; estimates to be negative and significant when they should not 
be. To determine whether this is the case and conduct a robustness test for the results in Table 3, 
the Chang et al. (2000) model is re-estimated after all firm-day observations that reached the 
respective daily price limit have been excluded from the sample.  
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The re-estimated results are presented in Table 6. Out of a total of 474,403 firm-day observations 
in the original sample, 12,475 were excluded. Only the equally weighted portfolio is used as the 
market proxy, since the returns on the market index (weighted by market capitalisation and 
reported by Datastream) would incorporate individual stock returns that should have been 
excluded in this case. The coefficients on #",%;  (@;) remain negative and significant at the 1% 
level (–0.170 for the up market, and –0.115 for the down market). The findings regarding the 
existence of herd behaviour in the HOSE are robust to daily price limit tests. 
 
A Wald test of the null hypothesis =>: @;)[ = @;\]^_ yields a :; statistic of 18.884, leading to 
the rejection of => at the 1% level. The daily price limit test not only confirms but also reinforces 
the finding of herding asymmetry between the up and down markets.  
 
Table 6 
Robustness Test with Daily Price Limits. 
Up/Down 
Market 
Constant UV  32,W  UX  32,W4  U4  34 54 p-value 
Up 1.579*** 0.517*** –0.170*** 0.253   
 
[0.029] [0.047] [0.010]    
Down 1.639*** 0.366*** –0.115*** 0.098 18.884*** 0.000 
 
[0.035] [0.081] [0.021]    
Notes: 
a) This table reports estimated coefficients of the following regression model: *+,-% = @> + @R #",% + @;#",%; +9%, where  #",%  and #",%;  respectively denote the absolute return and squared return on an equally weighted 
portfolio consisting of all stocks whose prices did not reach the daily limits at the close of trading. Out of a total 
of 474,403 firm-day observations, 12,475 were excluded from the sample. 
b) In the up/down model, all observations are restricted to those with positive/negative #",%. :; and <-value are 
statistics for the Wald test with the null hypothesis =>: @;)[ = @;\]^_. 
c) Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
d) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3.4 Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
The recent global financial crisis took a heavy toll on economies all around the world, including 
Vietnam’s. The effects of the crisis were inevitably reflected in the stock market. As shown in 
Figure 3, from an all-time high of 1,170.67 in March 2007, within less than two years, the VN-
Index lost almost 80% of its values, plummeting to a 4-year low of 235.50 (equivalent to a return 
of –56% per annum). 
 
Devastating as it was for many investors, the crisis nonetheless presented a learning opportunity. 
Witnessing the drastic downfall, many investors might have gathered valuable experience about 
the stock market. Some may have decided to better equip themselves in financial theories, while 
others spend time developing more sophisticated and rational trading strategies. These actions 
are all expected to make the market more rational, in the sense that it reduces the magnitude of 
herding, or better yet, remove it all together. We test for this effect using following specification: *+,-% = @> + @R-n#",% + @; 1 − -n #",% + @`-n(1 − -a)#",%; + @N 1 − -n (1 − -a)#",%; 	
 +	@S-n-a#",%; + @P(1 − -n)-a#",%; + 9% (14) 
where -n is a dummy variable that equals 1 when #",% > 0, and 0 otherwise; -a is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for all observations after the break date, which is determined using a 
Quandt-Andrews test for structural break (Quandt, 1960; Andrews, 1993).11 This specification 
allows the investigation of any change in the herding behaviour following the crisis, while 
simultaneously allowing for asymmetry between the up and down markets. Herd behaviour 
before the crisis will be reflected in @`  and @N , while herd behaviour after the crisis will be 
reflected in @S and @P.  
 
Table 7 below summarises the estimation results based on Equation (14). Using either proxy for 
the market return, the break date was estimated to be 26 May 2011. It is evident from the table 
that there was a reduction in the magnitude of herd behaviour in the HOSE before and after the 
break date. All estimates for @Sand @P  are lower (in absolute value) than @`  and @N , and the 
differences are statistically significant, as evidenced by Wald test statistics :no;  and :pqrs; , all 
																																								 																				
11 We thank an anonymous referee’s suggestion on this approach.  
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significant at the 1% level. Estimates of post-crisis herding in down market days (@P) are either 
significant only at the 10% level (–0.038 in model b), or even insignificant (–0.021 in model a). 
These results reveal considerable reduction in herd mentality, and even though the reduction is 
not sufficient to render the overall herding insignificant, it suggests that the market is moving 
towards rationality and higher efficiency following the recent financial crisis. 
 
The improvement of the market can be demonstrated by calculating #"at and #"us – the highest 
and lowest value of #",%  for which return dispersion is still expected to increase with #",% . 
These values are the roots of the first derivative of *+,-% with respect to #",% when -n is set to 
1 and 0, respectively. Accordingly, their formulas are #"at = − vw;[vy(RQ\z){v|\z] and #"us =− v~;[(RQ\z)v{vÄ\z]. The stronger the herding is, the less the market needs to swing for *+,-% to 
decrease instead of increasing with #",%, and the closer #"at and #"us will be to zero. 
 
The estimated values are presented in Panel B of Table 7. The models suggest that before the 
crisis, on up market days, herding starts manifesting itself (in the sense that it causes *+,-% to 
decrease with #",%) as early as when #",%	reaches around 1.4% (1.429% and 1.395%), whereas 
during down periods, the same effect surfaces as #",%  falls below –1.5% (–1.536% and  
–1.591%). After the crisis, on the other hand, the up market requires a return of 2.349% and 
above to exhibit a downwards trend of return dispersion, and the down market needs to fall by at 
least 4% (–4.483% and –7.940%) before *+,-% starts falling.12 
 
These findings are illustrated in Figure 6, in which the fitted values of *+,-% before and after 
the crisis are respectively represented by the dashed and solid curves. It is clear that the solid 
curve is above the dash one in both the up and down markets, which visualises the reduction in 
the magnitude of herding (the difference between @` and @S, or @N and @P given the same level of 
																																								 																				
12 Following a comment made by an anonymous referee, we also run yearly regressions for Equation (14) as a 
robustness check. The results show that, following 2011, there is an upward trend in the herding coefficients for 
both markets (the coefficients became less negative or even positive), which is consistent with the results reported 
in Table 7 (that there is a significant reduction in the magnitude of herding following the crisis). 
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#",%). The continued existence of herd mentality following the crisis is reflected in the shape of 
the solid curve. Rational asset pricing theory suggests a linear relationship between *+,-% and #",%  when herding does not exist, which would transform into a V-shaped curve (as opposed to 
two inverted U’s) when *+,-% is plotted against #",%. 
 #"at and #"us are also depicted in Figure 6, with the red dashed vertical lines representing the 
Before values, and the blue ones representing the After values.13 Not only is it clear that the After 
lines are further away from the vertical axis (#",% = 0), it is also highly noticeable that, compared 
to the up mark counterpart, the After (blue) line is further away from their corresponding Before 
(red) lines when the market is down. This indicates that the change in herd behaviour is more 
profound in the down market compared to the up market. One possible explanation is that the 
crisis has filtered out short-term investors and thus has retained relatively more long-term 
investors in the market, who are less likely to hurriedly sell their shares in down market. Investor 
optimism could also contribute to this result. Believing that the market is recovering from the 
crisis, investors might have developed a preference for buying shares whose prices are 
increasing, while at the same time refraining from selling stocks when prices are declining. 
 
Figure 6. Magnitude of Herding Before and After the Financial Crisis. 
																																								 																				
13	To save space, in Figure 6 we report only results using capitalization-weighted market index (Model b in Table 7). 
Similar graph is obtained for the equally weighted market index case and is available upon request.	
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Table 7 
Effects on Herd Behaviour of the Global Financial Crisis. 
Model 
Constant !"  #$%&,( !)  ) − #$ %&,( !+  #$ ) − #, %&,(+  !-  ) − #$ ) − #, %&,(+  !.  #$#,%&,(+  !/  ) − #$ #,%&,(+  !0  %+ 
Panel A: Regression Results 
(a) 1.678*** 0.414*** –0.341*** –0.145*** –0.111*** –0.088*** –0.021 0.224 
 [0.024] [0.054] [0.067] [0.013] [0.015] [0.029] [0.026]  
(b) 1.751*** 0.337*** –0.337*** –0.121*** –0.106*** –0.048** –0.038* 0.167 
 [0.028] [0.052] [0.061] [0.013] [0.014] [0.023] [0.020]  
Model Break Date 123+  14567+  %89:;<9&,=  %>:(9<&,=  %89:;<9&?@  %>:(9<&?@   
Panel B: Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
(a) 26/5/2011 9.440*** 52.047*** 1.429 2.349 –1.536 –7.940  
(b) 26/5/2011 26.954*** 52.490*** 1.395 3.497 –1.591 –4.483  
Notes: 
a) This table reports estimated coefficients of model: ABCDE = GH + GJDKLM,E + GN 1 − DK LM,E + GPDK(1 − DR)LM,EN + GT 1 − DK (1 − DR)LM,EN + 	GVDKDRLM,EN +GW(1 − DK)DRLM,EN + XEwhere DK = 1 when LM,E > 0 and 0 otherwise, while DR = 1 for all observations after the break date shown in panel B. Model (a) uses the return 
on an equally weighted portfolio as proxy for the market return (LM,E), while Model (b) uses the capitalization-weighted market index.  
b) Panel B presents the date for which there was a structural break in the herding coefficients, as determined by the supremum Wald test (Quandt, 1960; Andrews, 1993) 
with an unknown break date. [K\N  is the test statistic for the Wald test with the null hypothesis GP = GV, and []^_`N  is the test statistic for the Wald test with the null 
hypothesis GT = GW. 
c) LMRa is the highest values of LM,E > 0 for which the model still predicts an increasing relationship between ABCDE and LM,E . LMb` is the lowest values of LM,E < 0 for 
which the model still predicts an increasing relationship between ABCDE and LM,E . The subscripts Before and After indicate whether the value pertains to the period 
before or after the corresponding break date. 
d) Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
e) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3.5 Fundamental vs Non-fundamental Herding 
Panels A of Tables 8 and 9 present the results for testing for fundamental and non-fundamental 
herding as proposed in Section 2.3. Table 8 shows results of the decomposition step, where we 
follow Galariotis et al. (2015)’s approach described in Equation (7) to decompose the total !"#$% into !"#$&'(),% and !"#$(+(&'(),% respectively for fundamental and non-fundamental 
components. Table 9 reports the regression results obtained when !"#$&'(),%  and !"#$(+(&'(),% are regressed against market return factors, i.e., equations (8) and (9).14 
Table 8 
Decomposing Total !"#$% to !"#$&'(),% and !"#$(+(&'(),%. 
Model Constant (,-) ./,0 − .2 (,3) 4560 (,7) 8590 (,:) 5;50 (,<) .7 
Panel A: Galariotis et al. (2015)’s Approach 
VN Index for =>,% 1.907*** –0.009 0.049 0.031 0.019 0.005 
 
[0.021] [0.014] [0.036] [0.027] [0.016] 
 VN Index for =>,% 1.906*** 
 
0.055 0.030 
 
0.003 
 
[0.021] 
 
[0.035] [0.027] 
  Equally Weighted Portfolio for =>,%  1.832*** –0.012 0.081*** 0.059** 0.019 0.013 
 
[0.020] [0.014] [0.028] [0.026] [0.015] 
 Equally Weighted Portfolio for =>,%  1.832*** 
 
0.082*** 0.052** 
 
0.010 
 
[0.020] 
 
[0.029] [0.024] 
  
Model Constant (?-) ./,0 − .2  (?3) 4560  (?7) 8590  (?:) 5;50  (?<) .7 
Panel B: Absolute Value Approach 
VN Index for =>,% 1.608*** –0.084*** 0.367*** 0.283*** 0.070*** 0.242 
 
[0.035] [0.016] [0.036] [0.027] [0.017] 
 Equally Weighted Portfolio for =>,%  1.565*** –0.104*** 0.310*** 0.298*** 0.075*** 0.264 
 
[0.033] [0.015] [0.029] [0.025] [0.015] 
 Notes: 
a) Panel A of this table reports estimated coefficients of the following regression model: !"#$% = AB + AD =>,% − =E +AF"GH% + AIJGK% + ALGMG% + N% . Panel B of this table reports estimated coefficients of the following regression model: !"#$% = OB + OD =>,% − =E + OF "GH% + OI JGK% + OL GMG% + N%.  
b) From these equations, the total !"#$% is decomposed into a “non-fundamental” component (!"#$(+(&'(),%) captured by N%. 
The “fundamental” component (!"#$&'(),%) is defined as the estimated !"#$%. 
c) Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
d) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
																																								 																				
14 We collected data on the market value and book-to-market ratio for each stock from Datastream to construct the 
HML, SMB and MOM factors, following the approaches in Fama & French (1995) and Calhart (1997). 
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Note that all equations in Panel A of Table 8, following Galariotis et al. (2015)’s approach, have 
low explanatory powers (with =F ranging from 0.003 to 0.013) and factors that are insignificant 
even at the 10% level. Motivated by the poor performance of the four-factor model in explaining 
return dispersions, we improve the model by noting that !"#$%, by construction, responds to the 
absolute value of factors. To illustrate, consider the SMB factor, which measures the difference 
between the returns on a portfolio of “small” stocks and a portfolio of “big” stocks. When 
“small” stock returns deviate (either positively or negatively) from “big” stock returns, the 
absolute value of "GH%  rises, and so should !"#$% . Therefore, it makes more sense to use 
absolute value of "GH% as a regressor. The same argument applies to the other factors. As such, 
we suggest the following equation for decomposition in lieu of equation (7): 
 !"#$% = OB + OD =>,% − =E + OF "GH% + OI JGK% + OL GMG% + N% (15) 
We rerun the equations applying this modification and obtain the results in Table 8 Panel B 
(absolute value approach), which exhibit considerable improvements over the models in Panel A 
as indicated by higher =F and significant estimated coefficients at the 1% level.  
 
Turning to the herding regression, when fundamental (!"#$&'(),% ) and non-fundamental 
(!"#$(+(&'(),%) components are obtained by following Galariotis et al. (2015) approach, the 
herding coefficients (PI  and PL ) for !"#$&'(),%  as reported in Panel A of Table 9 are all 
negligible in magnitude and mostly insignificant. In contrast, all herding coefficients for !"#$(+(&'(),% are statistically significant at the 1% level ranging from –0.136 to –0.417. We 
obtain similar results when we drop two (insignificant) factors (=>,%	–	=E  and GMG%) in the 
decomposition step. In Panel B Table 9, when !"#$&'(),% and !"#$(+(&'(),% are obtained by 
using absolute value approach, the fundamental herding coefficients (PI  and PL ) are now 
negative and significant at 1% (ranging from –0.022 to –0.048), which incidentally have led to a 
reduction in the magnitude of non-fundamental herding (–0.079 to –0.111). Consequently, by 
using absolute values for regressors in equation (15), we are able to successfully extract the 
fundamental driven component of !"#$%, and subsequently uncover both fundamental and non-
fundamental herding. This reinforces our findings of herd behaviour, since even after 
conditioning on fundamental information (thus factoring out the so-called “spurious” herding), 
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we still find a non-linear, negative relationship between return dispersion and market return in 
Vietnam. Note that, while the focus is not on herding asymmetry, we still include both $=>,%F  
and (1 − $)=>,%F  terms on the right hand sides to allow for herding asymmetry. The estimated 
results confirm that the result of stronger herding in the up market remains and it does not 
depend on whether it is fundamental or non-fundamental herding. 
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Table 9 
Testing for Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Herding. 
Dependent Variable 
Constant 
(!") #$%,' !(  ( − # $%,' !*  #$%,'*  !+  ( − # $%,'*  !,  $* 
Panel A: Galariotis et al. 2015 Approach 
 VN Index for -.,/ 01234567,/ (from 2-factor Model) 1.909*** –0.004* –0.003 0.000 –0.001 0.016 
 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]  01234567,/ (from 4-factor Model) 1.906*** –0.008*** –0.015*** –0.000 –0.001 0.176 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001]  01236864567,/ (from 2-factor Model) –0.169*** 0.422*** –0.362*** –0.137*** –0.100*** 0.115 
 
[0.030] [0.047] [0.072] [0.012] [0.020]  01236864567,/ (from 4-factor Model) –0.165*** 0.425*** –0.350*** –0.136*** –0.100*** 0.114 
 [0.030] [0.048] [0.072] [0.012] [0.020]  
 Equally Weighted Portfolio for -.,/ 01234567,/ (from 2-factor Model) 1.830*** 0.019*** –0.002 –0.004*** –0.001 0.028 
 [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001]  01234567,/ (from 4-factor Model) 1.825*** 0.017*** –0.015*** –0.005*** –0.001 0.032 
 [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001]  01236864567,/ (from 2-factor Model) –0.170*** 0.458*** –0.417*** –0.155*** –0.122*** 0.176 
 
[0.023] [0.043] [0.064] [0.010] [0.016]  01236864567,/ (from 4-factor Model) –0.166*** 0.461*** –0.404*** –0.153*** –0.122*** 0.174 
 [0.023] [0.043] [0.065] [0.010] [0.016]  
Panel B: Absolute Value Approach 
 VN Index for -.,/ 01234567,/ (from 4-factor Model) 1.917*** 0.049** –0.042* –0.029*** –0.022*** 0.059 
 
[0.013] [0.020] [0.025] [0.005] [0.007] 
 01236864567,/ (from 4-factor Model) –0.177*** 0.368*** –0.323*** –0.107*** –0.079*** 0.084 
 
[0.024] [0.039] [0.058] [0.010] [0.015] 
  Equally Weighted Portfolio for -.,/ 01234567,/ (from 4-factor Model) 1.831*** 0.106*** –0.075*** –0.048*** –0.036*** 0.121 
 
[0.010] [0.021] [0.022] [0.005] [0.006] 
 01236864567,/ (from 4-factor Model) –0.172*** 0.372*** –0.344*** –0.111*** –0.087*** 0.107 
 
[0.020] [0.035] [0.054] [0.008] [0.013] 
 Notes: 
a) This table reports estimated coefficients of the following regression model: 0123/ = :; + :=3-.,/ + :> 1 − 3 -.,/ + :@3-.,/> + :A 1 − 3 -.,/> + B/, where 3 = 1 for all observations with -.,/ > 0, and 0 otherwise.  
b) 4-factor model refers to models where 0123/  is separated into the “fundamental” and “non-fundamental” components using 4 factors (Fama-French & 
Momentum). 2-factor model refers to models where 0123/ is separated into the “fundamental” and “non-fundamental” components using only two factors 1EF/ and GEH/ given that other factors are not significant.  
c) Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
d) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3.6 Within- and Between-Group Herding 
Results of tests for within- and between group herding are reported in Table 10, with Panel A 
reporting results for equation (10) (positive alpha stocks), and Panel B for equation (11) 
(negative alpha stocks).15 Model (a) includes all stocks regardless of statistical significance of the 
estimated alphas. Model (b) excludes all stocks with alphas that are not statistically significant at 
the 10% level. 
Table 10 
Testing for Within- and Between-Group Herding. 
Model Constant (!") #$%,' (!() #$%,'  (!)) #$%,')  (!*) #+%,')  (!,) -./0+,' (!1) #) 
Panel A: Positive Alpha Stocks Regression 
(a) 0.413*** –0.011 0.275*** –0.133*** 0.064*** 0.659*** 0.588 
 
[0.095] [0.007] [0.039] [0.012] [0.010] [0.055] 
 (b) 1.224*** –0.013 0.420*** –0.138*** 0.012*** 0.171*** 0.186 
 
[0.060] [0.009] [0.054] [0.015] [0.004] [0.023] 
 
Model Constant (!2) #+%,' (!3) #+%,'  (!4) #+%,')  (!5) #$%,')  (!(") -./0$,' (!(() #) 
Panel B: Negative Alpha Stocks Regression 
(a) 0.549*** 0.007 0.149*** –0.125*** 0.071*** 0.718*** 0.581 
 
[0.058] [0.006] [0.035] [0.011] [0.008] [0.036] 
 (b) 0.833*** 0.003 0.519*** –0.157*** 0.001 0.375*** 0.194 
 
[0.107] [0.016] [0.071] [0.015] [0.008] [0.049] 
 Notes: 
a) Panel A reports estimated coefficients for equation (10). Panel B reports estimated coefficients for equation (11). 
b) +/– refers to the measures (789:;, <=,;) formed using a portfolio of stocks with positive/negative alphas (>’s). 
c) Models (a) use portfolios formed of all stocks available. Models (b) only allow portfolios of stocks whose alphas are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
d) Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
e) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
It is clear that there existed within-group herding in the market, for the corresponding 
coefficients (?@ and ?A) are negative and statistically significant, even at the 1% level. Thus, 
under our assumption that positive alpha stocks tend to be held by arbitrageurs and noise traders 
are more likely to trade on negative alpha stocks, the results imply that both groups of investors 
																																								 																				
15 Alpha values used to construct the relevant positive/negative alpha portfolios were calculated on yearly basis for 
the period 2007-2015. We thank an anonymous referee’s suggestion on this approach. 
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engage in herd behaviour among themselves, although for possibly different reasons (fund 
managers might have wanted to preserve their reputation or compensation, while noise traders 
could have irrationally mimicked others’ actions). 
 
Between-group herding, on the other hand, is less apparent. The estimated between-group 
herding coefficient for positive alpha stocks (?B) are significant at the 1% level, but are positive 
(0.064 and 0.012). This is evidence against herding, and is consistent with the assumption that 
arbitrageurs are sophisticated traders, i.e., arbitrageurs are not infected by market jitters easily. 
One possible explanation for this estimated result is that, when arbitrageurs realise that noise 
traders are forming herds due to pseudo-signals, instead of following arbitrage strategy to bring 
asset prices back to their fundamental values, they decide to create even more mixed signals to 
take advantage on the situation. Consequently, arbitrageurs do not simply sell or buy their 
existing shares (of positive alpha stocks) arbitrarily. Instead, they refer to their strategies and 
adjust their holdings accordingly, leading to changes to the prices of positive alpha stocks of 
various degrees, thereby raising rather than lowering 789:$,;. 
 
The between-group herding coefficient for negative alpha stocks (?CD), meanwhile, is positive 
(0.071) and significant at the 1% level for model (a), and insignificant at the 10% level in model 
(b). The fact that we no longer obtain a significant ?CD when we apply a stricter definition of 
negative alpha stocks supports the notion that it is this more strictly defined portfolio that 
resembles more closely the typical holdings of noise traders in the market. This also suggests that 
noise traders are not as sophisticated as arbitrageurs. Since they are unable to identify positive 
alpha stocks and often trade without much information, it is not surprising that their stock return 
dispersion is not responsive to the returns on the positive alpha stock portfolio. 
 
The counterpart 789:; terms (789:+,; in panel A and 789:$,; in panel B) are included to allow 
for the possibility of co-movements of return dispersion between groups of stocks, as previously 
documented by Chang & Zheng (2010) and Galariotis et al. (2015). In addition, as these terms 
are correlated with the counterpart squared portfolio return (<+=,;E  and <$=,;E , respectively), if 
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these two terms were not included, our model would lead to biased estimates of ?B and ?CD, this 
resulting in misleading conclusions on between-group herding. As shown in Table 10, both ?F 
and ?CC are significant at the 1% and positive. This is consistent with our previous conjecture 
that, heterogeneous investors interact with each other, even though they may not herd from their 
counterpart. A possible interpretation for the positive estimates is the fundamental herding 
observed in Section 3.5. As rational investors (arbitrageurs) face the same fundamental 
information, they arrive at the same investing decisions, which results in a lower 789:$,; . 
Facing the same information, noise traders, however, may disregard it and choose to follow the 
market consensus, thus driving down 789:+,; . It is this combination that yields a positive 
relationship between the two CSAD series. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
By exploring the relationship between return dispersion and return on the market, we document 
compelling evidence of herd behaviour in the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) of Vietnam 
between 2007 and 2015. As the market experiences large price movements, investors tend to 
dismiss their private belief and rashly follow other participants, thereby pushing stock prices in 
the same direction and lowering return dispersion. This is captured by negative coefficients for 
the relationships between dispersion and squared market return or with dummy variables 
representing “extreme” market conditions. The results are robust to daily price limit tests. 
 
Tests for asymmetry herding in up vis-à-vis down market indicate that, consistent with other 
studies on herd behaviour in Asian markets, herding is stronger during periods of upward as 
opposed to downward movements. The asymmetry appears to have been driven by stocks with 
small market capitalisation. The magnitude of herding in the market seems to have significantly 
reduced following the global financial crisis, possibly due to improvements on the part of 
investors as they better equip themselves with knowledge, experience and more sophisticated 
trading strategies. The improvement appears more evident in the down market, which suggests 
investor optimism in market recovery and/or a growth in the proportion of long-term traders in 
the market. 
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By improving upon Galariotis et al. (2015)’s approach of decomposing total cross-sectional 
absolute deviation (CSAD) into a component that can be explained by fundamental factors, and a 
component that cannot, we also document robust non-fundamental herding in the market when 
fundamental (or spurious) herding is factored out. Our approach of using the absolute values of 
the fundamental factors in the decomposition relates more closely the mathematical construction 
of CSAD and the factors, thus offering higher explanatory power. 
 
The above empirical results contribute to the literature on testing stock market efficiency in 
emerging markets. Similar to other researches on Vietnam stock market such as Truong et al. 
(2007) and Metghalchi et al. (2013) both find significant profitability of momentum strategies 
and technical trading rules, this study suggests behaviour that is inconsistent with the assumption 
of investor rationality and efficient market hypothesis, and are indicative of market inefficiency. 
In addition, by relaxing the assumption of investor homogeneity and allowing both arbitrageurs 
and noise traders in the market, we find evidence of herding within each group, as well as 
interaction between them and thus reveal the possibility that arbitrageurs might take advantage of 
noise traders’ positive feedback mentality and bring stocks even further away from their 
fundamental values to benefit from such herds. 
 
Due to data constraints, we are unable to further investigate two issues. Firstly, we propose that 
the source of the herding asymmetry between the up and down markets could be small 
capitalisation stocks. We however could not carry the investigation further to reveal the 
underlying mechanism for this phenomenon due to data constraint. Secondly, we document 
evidence indicative of interactions between arbitrageurs and noise traders in the market, and in 
particular, how the former might have attempted to take advantage of the latter’s herd mentality. 
As the available data does not permit more precise test or identification of each group’s 
stockholdings, we are unable to conduct further investigation to confirm our conjecture. We 
agree that there might be other forces in place that result in the positive relationship between <+=,;E  and 789:$,; documented in Table 10. We leave these issues for future studies.  
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Several recommendations based on our findings are proposed with the aim of mitigating the 
effects of herd behaviour in the market. For investors, herding increases correlation among 
individual returns, which raises the need for a larger number of securities with low correlation to 
achieve the same level of diversification than in a market which does not exhibit herd mentality. 
For the government, the presence of herding signifies inadequacy of information for decision-
making for investors, which in turn calls for additional requirements for better information, in 
terms of both quality and quantity, at both firm and industry levels. There should also be policies 
to attract foreign and institutional investors, who can help improve the stock market with their 
expertise and experience. These recommendations are also applicable to emerging markets and 
developing countries, where individuals are the key market participants and the financial 
regulation system is still largely in development.  
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Appendix A: Data Clean-up 
The data are subject to a number of adjustments. Firstly, there exist weekdays during the period 
in which there was no trading (due to public holidays taking place or technical difficulties). 
Datastream typically enters the same data for these days as the closest previous trading day. All 
such values are removed prior to computation of returns. 
 
Secondly, it is not uncommon for stocks to be delisted or moved from one exchange to another. 
As such, price series for several stocks are truncated so that only the data pertaining to the period 
in which the stocks were listed on HOSE are considered. Table A.1 reports the cut-off dates for 
stocks originally on another exchange started being traded on HOSE, while Table (ii) presents 
the cut-off dates for stocks which were delisted from the HOSE. The dates are provided by 
Datastream (for dead stocks) and the Vietnam Securities Depository (VSD) (2015) (for stocks 
delisted due to failure to meet HOSE listing requirements or stocks moved to other exchanges). 
 
Table A.1 
Stock Commencement Dates on HOSE. 
Stocks 
HOSE Trade 
Commencement 
Date 
Stocks 
HOSE Trade 
Commencement 
Date 
CDC 10/09/2010 TCO 20/12/2011 
PAN 14/12/2010 SVI 15/03/2012 
ACC 29/06/2011 C32 30/11/2012 
PDN 29/08/2011 FLC 02/08/2013 
HU1 02/11/2011 MWG 11/07/2014 
ITD 20/12/2011 SHP 18/07/2014 
Source: Summarised by the author from VSD (2015). 
 
	42 
	
Table A.2 
Delisting Dates of Former HOSE Stocks. 
Stocks HOSE Delisting Date Stocks HOSE Delisting Date 
BBT 07/08/2009 NTB 26/07/2013 
FPC 11/08/2011 AGD 28/08/2013 
DVD 05/09/2011 CLP 15/05/2014 
DCC 15/12/2011 FDG 15/05/2014 
TRI 10/04/2012 PXM 20/05/2014 
MCV 11/05/2012 CNT 20/05/2014 
CAD 06/06/2012 ALP 31/12/2014 
MKP 12/07/2012 SBC 12/02/2015 
CSG 04/10/2012 HLA 25/02/2015 
BAS 08/10/2012 NHW 25/02/2015 
VFC 05/02/2013 MPC 31/03/2015 
DDM 15/04/2013 HIS 04/05/2015 
IFS 03/05/2013 VNI 05/05/2015 
VSG 07/05/2013 NVN 05/05/2015 
VES 07/05/2013 DCT 08/05/2015 
FBT 17/06/2013 VST 13/05/2015 
Source: Summarised by the author from VSD (2015) and Datastream. 
 
Thirdly, prices of numerous stocks on 22 April 2013, as reported by Datastream, appear to be 
highly unusual. Prices might jump (drop) sharply 19 April (Friday) to 22 April (Monday), 
followed by a comparably sharp drop (jump) between the 22 April and 23 April (illustrated in 
Table A.3 below). This is possibly due to errors made by the data provider. As a precaution, all 
observations for 22 April 2013 are dropped.  
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Table A.3 
Stock Prices on 19, 22 and 23 April 2013 Reported by Datastream. 
Stocks 
Prices (Vietnam Dong) 
19 April 2013 22 April 2013 23 April 2013 
FPT 25,739 14,957 25,948 
MBB 12,264 4,791 12,360 
HAG 20,091 5,455 19,273 
JVC 13,496 7,472 13,725 
KDC 40,416 5,167 39,583 
KBC 6,300 10,200 6,300 
NBB 12,864 3,963 12,577 
TCL 20,500 15,800 20,300 
GTT 11,200 4,900 11,200 
VHG 2,400 11,133 2,200 
Source: Summarised by the author from Datastream. 
  
